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By:  Mark D. Christiansen1 
 
I.  ROYALTY OWNER LITIGATION 
 
A. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Affirms Decision of the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma Certifying 
a Modified Royalty Owner Class 
 
In Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC,2 the plaintiff 
royalty owners (collectively, Naylor Farms) contended that Chaparral 
systematically underpaid royalties on production from approximately 
2,500 Oklahoma oil and gas wells by improperly deducting from 
royalty payments certain costs that the plaintiffs contended should 
have been borne solely by Chaparral under Oklahoma law.  The 
district court granted Naylor Farms’ motion seeking certification of a 
 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V6.I3.13  
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City litigation firm of Edinger Leonard & Blakley PLLC. 
 2. 923 F.3d 779, 784 (10th Cir. 2019). 
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class of royalty owners under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.3  In the present proceedings, Chaparral has appealed the 
district court’s order granting class certification.4 
Naylor Farms brought this suit alleging “claims for breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, unjust enrichment, and 
failure to produce in paying quantities.”5  Naylor Farms asserted that 
Chaparral breached what was described by the court as the “implied 
duty of marketability (“IDM”)”6 by improperly deducting what were 
described as “GCDTP-service costs”7 from the royalty payments 
Chaparral made to Naylor Farms and other similarly-situated royalty 
owners.  More specifically, certain midstream companies acquired 
title to or possession of the gas and natural gas liquids (“NGLs”) at or 
near the wellhead, and then performed certain GCDTP services and 
sold the treated gas to downstream purchasers.  In turn, the midstream 
companies deducted from the gross proceeds the amount they received 
from the downstream sales of production, i.e., the costs and fees 
associated with performing the GCDTP services.  They paid Chaparral 
the resulting net proceeds.  Chaparral then computed royalty payments 
“based on the net proceeds it receives from the midstream companies, 
rather than . . . based on the gross proceeds the midstream companies 
receive from the downstream sales.”8  Naylor Farms asserted that this 
approach to calculating royalty payments “requires royalty owners to 
bear the costs of transforming unprocessed gas into a marketable 
product” in breach of the IDM.9 
 
 3. Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, No. CIV-11-0634-HE 2017, 
WL 18754, at *9 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 17, 2017) (“[P]laintiffs’ motion for class 
certification [Doc. #134], with the stated modifications, is granted.  Plaintiffs’ fraud 
claim will be excluded and the class will be limited to include those leases with 
“Mittelstaedt Clauses” listed on plaintiffs’ Exhibit 29.”) By later proceedings, the 
class definition was further revised to specify June 1, 2006, as the commencement 
date of the class period. Naylor Farms filed its Amended Class Definition (including 
the incorporation of the revisions referred to in the district court’s Order of January 
17, 2017) with the clerk of the district court.  See Doc. 175, filed April 17, 2017, and 
Doc. 176, filed April 18, 2017. 
 4. Naylor Farms, 923 F.3d at 783.  
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. (“The IDM imposes upon lessees ‘a duty to provide a marketable product 
available to market.’”) citing Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 
1206 (Okla. 1998). 
 7. Id. (explaining that “GCDTP services” refers to the “gathering, compressing, 
dehydrating, transporting, and producing” of raw or unprocessed gas.) 
 8. Id. at 784. 
 9. Id. 
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Naylor Farms moved the court to certify a class of similarly 
situated royalty owners.10  In opposition to that request, Chaparral 
argued that a determination of whether it breached the IDM would 
require an assessment of “individual issues, including the obligation 
created by each” individual oil and gas lease “and the gas produced 
from each” individual well,11 as well as individual questions as to 
damages.  Chaparral urged that those issues would predominate over 
any common questions.  The district court disagreed and found that 
class certification was appropriate, except that it excluded Naylor 
Farms’ fraud claim from the class certification order.12  
Chaparral appealed.  It asserted three primary arguments in 
support of its effort to obtain a reversal of the class certification order.  
First, Chaparral contended that marketability constitutes an individual 
question that predominates over any common questions.  Second, it 
argued that distinctions in lease language also give rise to individual 
questions that likewise predominate in this case.  Finally, Chaparral 
contended that there is a lack of evidence showing that it employs a 
uniform payment methodology to support certification.  The Tenth 
Circuit proceeded to address “whether the district court abused its 
discretion in concluding that Naylor Farms satisfied Rule 23’s 
certification requirements.”13 
The court first addressed the issue of marketability.  The Tenth 
Circuit stated that “[i]t has been more than two decades since the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court (“OSC”) has said anything meaningful 
about marketability,”14 citing Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc, 
supra.  However, finding that Mittelstaedt did not provide guidance 
on the specific marketability questions presented in this appeal, the 
court stated that its “task is ‘to predict how [the OSC] would rule’ if it 
were to answer those questions.”15  The court then reviewed the 
principles and reasoning applied by the OSC in Mittelstaedt, and in 
the more recent Oklahoma Court of Appeals decisions in Whisenant 
v. Strat Land Expl. Co.16 and Pummill v. Hancock Expl. LLC.17   
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 785. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  
 16. 429 P.3d 703 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018). 
 17. 419 P.3d 1268 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018). 
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Chaparral contended that the district court erred in ruling “that 
(1) the question of when the gas became marketable can be answered 
via generalized, classwide proof and (2) as a result, the marketability 
question doesn’t defeat predominance.”18  Chaparral additionally 
argued that the district court erred in treating marketability as a 
question of law, rather than as a question of fact.  It asserted that a 
determination of the marketability question and whether Chaparral 
breached the IDM requires a “well-by-well analysis to determine 
whether any of the gas at issue was marketable at the wellhead.”19  
Thus, the marketability question would defeat commonality and 
predominance. 
However, the Tenth Circuit found that “the district court’s 
ruling that marketability is subject to class-wide proof under the 
specific facts of this case is entirely consistent with the [Oklahoma 
Court of Civil Appeals’] decision in Pummill.”20  With regard to 
Chaparral’s reliance on the Whisenant decision, the court noted 
Chaparral’s insistence that “marketability can never be susceptible to 
classwide proof because it will always require an individualized 
assessment of the gas produced by each well.”21  However, the court 
emphasized the Whisenant’s finding that certain factual issues were 
not susceptible to generalized proof according to reference to that 
particular case.  “[T]he Whisenant court recognized that the OSC has 
declined to adopt a uniform test for determining when gas becomes 
marketable [and instead] left the issue open to resolution on a case-by-
case basis.”22  The court left open the possibility that, in some cases, a 
determination might be made as to “when gas became marketable 
without undertaking an individualized inquiry into the quality of that 
gas.”23 
The court then found that “the facts in Pummill (and, by 
extension, the facts in this [Chaparral] case) fit comfortably in the 
space ‘left . . . open’ by Whisenant.”24  In light of the court’s reading 
of Pummill and Whisenant, the Tenth Circuit predicted that the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court would hold:  
 
 18. Naylor Farms, 923 F.3d at 791. 
 19. Id. at 790. 
 20. Id. at 794. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 795. 
 24. Id. 
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Under the facts of this case, a jury could determine 
when the gas at issue became marketable without 
individually assessing the quality of that gas; instead, a 
jury could make this determination based solely on the 
expert testimony that all the gas at issue was required 
to undergo at least one GCDTP service before it could 
“reach” and be “sold into” the pipeline market.25 
 
The district court in Chaparral was found to have not abused 
its discretion by concluding that the question of marketability “in this 
particular case is subject to common, classwide proof for purposes of 
satisfying Rule 23’s commonality and predominance requirements.”26 
The court next turned to Chaparral’s contention that 
distinctions in oil and gas lease language present individual questions 
that predominated over any common questions.  The district court 
below rejected that argument and found that “its decision to limit the 
class to leases containing a Mittelstaedt Clause renders such an 
individualized analysis unnecessary.”27  Most of the Tenth Circuit’s 
discussion addressing this particular area of the appellants’ arguments 
focuses on which issues were presented and preserved below.  The 
Tenth Circuit was not persuaded that the district court abused its 
discretion in certifying the class despite the existence of what the court 
characterized as minor variations in oil and gas lease language. 
Finally, on appeal, Chaparral urged that “Naylor Farms failed 
to demonstrate that Chaparral uses a uniform payment methodology 
to calculate royalty payments,”28 and that such failure warranted the 
denial of class certification.  However, while the existence of a 
uniform payment methodology, alone, was found by the court to be 
insufficient to meet the predominance requirement, the court rejected 
the notion that such a methodology is a necessary component for 
satisfying predominance.  Moreover, the court noted that “[t]he fact 
that damages may have to be ascertained on an individual basis is not, 
standing alone, sufficient to defeat class certification.”29  Naylor 
 
 25. Id. at 781. 
 26. Id. at 795. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 798. 
 29. Id. at 798 (citing Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 882 F.3d 905, 922 (10th Cir. 
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Farms presented evidence that individualized evidence will not be 
needed because its expert can determine damages on a class wide basis 
through the use of a model.  The Tenth Circuit further noted that the 
district court could also, if needed, divide the class into subclasses for 
purposes of determining damages.30  The district court was found to 
have not abused its discretion in concluding that individual questions 
about damages do not defeat predominance. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s order granting Naylor Farms’ motion for class certification 
subject to certain modifications of the class definition consistent with 
its opinion. 
 
B. Oklahoma Court of Appeals Reverses Certification of Class of 
Royalty Owners 
 
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals, in Whisenant v. Strat Land 
Exploration Co.,31 reversed a decision of the District Court of Beaver 
County certifying a royalty owner class. Whisenant sued Strat Land 
alleging, on behalf of a proposed class of similarly situated royalty 
owners, the underpayment or non-payment of royalties on natural gas 
and its constituents from certain Oklahoma wells. The evidence 
showed that the putative class included approximately eighty-eight 
Oklahoma wells and approximately 1,000 royalty owners throughout 
the United States (¶ 15, note 11). The proposed class wells were 
located within, or adjacent to, Ellis, Harper, Beaver, and Texas 
Counties.32 
Whisenant asserted that one of the issues of law and fact 
common to the proposed class was “whether gas [is] in Marketable 
Condition at the meter run/gathering line inlet.”33 He additionally 
argued, among other issues, that Strat Land paid royalties to him and 
to the proposed class using a common method based on the net 
revenue Strat Land received under its marketing contracts rather than 
 
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 143 (2018)). 
 30. Id. at 790. 
 31. 429 P.3d 703, 704 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018). 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
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paying royalties based on the gross amount received by the midstream 
purchaser from its sale of the gas at interstate or intrastate markets.34 
The district court certified a class, subject to a series of exclusions not 
described below, consisting of all royalty owners in Oklahoma wells 
that:  
 
(a) [were] operated by [Strat Land]; (b) marketed by 
Strat Land to DCP Midstream (f/k/a Duke Energy Field 
Services)’ and (c) that have produced gas and/or gas 
constituents (such as residue gas, natural gas liquids, 
helium, or condensate) from February 12, 2009 to the 
time Class Notice is given.35 
 
The district court granted class certification under 12 O.S. § 
2023(B)(3). Strat Land filed an interlocutory appeal of the class 
certification order.36 
The court of appeals observed that the primary issue on appeal 
is whether there are common questions of law or fact. However, since 
the class was certified below under 12 O.S. § 2023(B)(3), the court 
noted the additional requirement that common issues predominate 
over other questions. Early in its discussion, the court stated that “[i]n 
the present case, class certification is inappropriate because a ‘highly 
individualized’ review of the facts pertaining to each of the numerous 
wells is necessary.”37 In concluding that the lower court’s order 
granting class certification should be reversed, some of the key 
findings of the court of appeals included the following: 
First, the court found that the standards in Oklahoma for 
determining whether certain types of post-production costs may be 
deducted in the computation of gas royalty payments, as recognized in 
the landmark case of Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc.,38 require 
a fact-intensive inquiry. That the trial court found “that Strat Land had 
 
 34. Id. at 705. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 705–06 (Under Oklahoma state court procedure, an order granting or 
denying class certification is “subject to a de novo standard of review by any 
appellate court reviewing the order.” citing 12 O.S. Supp. 2014 § 2023(C)(2)). 
 37. Id. at 707 (The Oklahoma Court of Appeals cited in support of this 
conclusion its earlier decision in Strack v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 405 P.3d 131 (Okla. 
Civ. App. 2017), cert. denied). 
 38. Id. 
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a common corporate policy of not paying royalty on the gross value of 
the gas produced under the leases”39 was insufficient to satisfy the 
predominance requirement of 12 O.S. § 2023(B)(3).40 Rather, in 
discussing the complex analysis of determining whether the costs 
deducted in the computation of gas royalties were expenses necessary 
to make the gas a marketable product, the court of appeals stated that 
“highly individualized and fact-intensive review of each Class 
Members’ claim would be necessary to determine if [the defendant] 
underpaid oil or gas royalties.”41 
Second, as a consequence of the above, the court of appeals 
rejected Whisenant’s contention that “[c]lass action treatment will 
allow a large number of similarly situated individuals to prosecute 
their common claims in a single forum, simultaneously, efficiently, 
and without duplication of time, expense and effort on the part of those 
individuals, witnesses, the courts and/or [Strat Land].”42 The court was 
likewise unpersuaded by Whisenant’s contention that disposing of the 
case as a class action would “avoid the possibility of inconsistent 
and/or varying results in this matter arising out of the same facts.”43 
Third, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals declined Whisenant’s 
assertion that “determination of the quality of gas and other facts 
pertinent to each well are susceptible to generalized proof.”44   
Fourth, the appellate court rejected the use of assumptions 
parallel to those used in the case of Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,45 
finding: 
 
[A]n assumption analogous to that forwarded by the 
employees in Tyson—i.e., an assumption that, for each 
gas well within the proposed class, the royalty-
 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. at 708 (The court of appeals cited EQT Production Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 
347, 366 (4th Cir. 2014) quoting “Even a plethora of identical practices will not 
satisfy the predominance requirement if the defendants’; common conduct has little 
bearing on the central issue in the litigation – in this case, whether the defendants 
underpaid royalties.”). 
 41. Id. at 709 (citing Strack v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 405 P.3d 131 (Okla. Civ. App. 
2017), and Foster v. Apache Corp., 285 F.R.D. 632, 638 (W.D. Okla. 2012)).  
 42. Id. at 710. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  
 45. 136 S.Ct. 1036 (2016). 
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valuation point and deductible costs can be set at the 
same average point and amount — is unwarranted. 46  
 
The court concluded that a class-wide determination based 
either on the variables as they existed with Whisenant’s one well “or 
on an average sampling (i.e., of gas quality, proximity of interstate 
pipelines, availability and proximity of processing plants, market 
realities, and so forth) would result in distorted and inconsistent 
awards to the various members of the class.”47 Citing Tyson Foods, 
Inc. v. Marez,48 the court noted that “a judgment must be based upon 
evidence that establishes essential facts as probably, not merely 
possibly being true.”49 
Fifth, the court of appeals found “[a] reliance upon facts 
derived from other wells would be as impermissible as it would have 
been to determine liability in Wal-Mart based upon generalized 
evidence derived from other store managers.”50 The court of appeals 
rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that class action certification was 
appropriate here based on their contention that the case would rely on 
admissible expert testimony to prove class-wide liability. 
Finally, the court held that, even if Strat Land paid royalties to 
the members of the putative class using a common method, “the 
establishment of this common fact fails to resolve the issue of liability, 
an issue which remains individual rather than common.”51 The court 
specifically rejected Whisenant’s contention that the alleged common 
method was either right or wrong, class-wide. 
Concluding that the predominance and superiority requirements 
for class certification under 12 O.S. § 2023(B)(3) were not satisfied in 
this case, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order granting 
class certification. Whisenant’s subsequent petition for certiorari 
review by the OSC was denied by order issued on October 1, 2018.  
Mandate was issued on October 31, 2018. 
 
 
 46. Whisenant, 429 P.3d at 710–11. 
 47. Id. at 711. 
 48. 931 P.2d 760 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996). 
 49. Whisenant, 429 P.3d at 711. 
 50. Id.at 712. 
 51. Id. 
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II. OIL AND GAS LEASE CANCELLATION, TERMINATION AND BREACH 
OF OBLIGATION CASES (OTHER THAN ROYALTY) 
 
A. Court of Appeals Affirms the District Court’s Finding that the 
Term Assignments at Issue in this Case Required the Commencement 
of the Well Within the Primary Term or any Extension Thereof, but 
did Not Require Completion of the Well within the Primary Term. 
 
In the case of Blue Dolphin Energy, LLC v. Devon Energy 
Production Company, LP,52 the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s 
order granting partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant 
Devon.  This appeal was assigned to the Oklahoma Court of Appeals’ 
accelerated docket under OSC Rule 1.36, and the case was considered 
based on the briefs filed with the district court, without appellate 
briefing.   
The plaintiffs had entered into a Term Assignment of Oil and 
Gas Leases with Felix Energy, LLC (Devon’s predecessor) in April 
2014.  In January of 2016, Felix merged with Devon, and Devon 
assumed the interests covered by the assignments.  The Blue Dolphin 
plaintiffs alleged that the assignment:  
 
contained a “primary term of three (3) years, 
commencing on the first day of the calendar month that 
immediately follows the Effective Date, which was 
April 30, 2014.”  Plaintiffs [Blue Dolphin] state in the 
petition that the Assignments “required the assignee to 
complete a well capable of producing in paying 
quantities prior to May 1, 2017, which is the expiration 
of the primary term.”  [Blue Dolphin plaintiffs] 
contend that because Defendant failed to complete the 
well by May 1, 2017, the primary term in the lease 
“expired and the secondary term never commenced.”53 
 
The plaintiffs asserted that the leasehold interests covered by 
the subject assignment reverted back to the Blue Dolphin plaintiffs 
because Devon did not complete any wells by the end of the May 1, 
 
 52. Case No. 117,134 (Okla. Civ. App.  May 30, 2019) (Not for Publication); 
Court Issue, 90 Okla. B.J. 707, 779–80 (Vol. 12) (June 22, 2019) 
 53. Blue Dolphin Energy, No. 117,134 at 2–3. 
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2017 primary term.  They further alleged that Devon trespassed and 
interfered with the plaintiffs’ right of exclusive possession of the 
property underlying the assignments of leases “by remaining on the 
property, continuing to conduct operations thereon, and extracting oil 
and gas from the property without Plaintiffs’ authorization.”54  Finally, 
the plaintiffs argued that Devon continuously converted plaintiffs’ 
crude oil and natural gas produced after the May 1, 2017 termination 
of the assignment of leases. 
The Blue Dolphin plaintiffs moved for partial summary 
judgment in their favor, contending that: (a) the letter agreement and 
term assignments in favor of Felix, now Devon, unambiguously 
required completion of a well by May 1, 2017; (b) Devon did not 
complete a well by May 1, 2017; and (c) without a completed well by 
May 1, 2017, the term assignments expired and reverted to the 
plaintiffs.   
Defendant Devon filed a combined: (a) response in opposition 
plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment; and (b) cross-motion 
for partial summary judgment in favor of Devon.  It asserted, among 
other allegations, that the assignments were extended because Devon 
was engaged in drilling or completion operations as of May 1, 2017.  
The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and granted the 
defendant Devon’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment.  The 
Blue Dolphin plaintiffs appealed.  
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals first examined certain 
detailed provisions of the Term Assignment of Oil and Gas Leases and 
the related Letter Agreement of April 16, 2014 to assess whether those 
terms were ambiguous:   
 
“The mere fact the parties disagree or press for a 
different construction does not make an agreement 
ambiguous.”  Id. ¶ 14.  “A contract is ambiguous if it is 
reasonably susceptible to at least two different 
constructions.”  Id.55   
 
The court recited a series of additional rules of construction.   
 
 54. Id. at 3–4. 
 55. Id. at 9. 
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Blue Dolphin contended that the assignments required that 
Devon complete a well by May 1, 2017, in order to avoid the 
expiration of the assignments.  Blue Dolphin further asserted that the 
language of the documents allowed Devon to continue to hold the 
lands so long as Devon commenced drilling or reworking operations 
within ninety days of the completion of the prior well as either a 
commercial producer or a dry hole. 
However, Devon argued that since it was engaged in 
operations relating to its well through May 1, 2017 and those 
operations were ongoing through the completion of the well as a 
commercial producer in July of 2017, the primary term of the Term 
Assignment was extended through the completion. 
At the hearing on the summary judgment motions, the trial 
court found that the primary term of the assignment extended past May 
1, 2017, for the purpose of allowing Devon to complete its ongoing 
well operations.  The court quieted title in favor of Devon.  Blue 
Dolphin appealed. 
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that 
the assignments only required the commencement of the well within 
the primary term or any extension thereof, and the diligent 
continuation of drilling operations through the completion of the well 
as a commercial producer.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Devon and held 
that the primary term of the lease was extended under the language of 
the term assignment to allow Devon to continue ongoing drilling 
operations through to their completion. 
 
III. OIL AND GAS CONTRACTS, TRANSACTIONS AND TITLE MATTERS 
 
A. Court Addresses Lawsuit by Private Business Group to Obtain a 
Copy of Public Real Estate Records from the County Clerks for Use 
in the Group’s Business of Selling Rights of Access of its Copies of 
the Records 
 
The case of TexasFile, LLC v. Boevers56 presented Texas 
File’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of its motion for summary 
judgment and that court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of 
 
 56. 437 P.3d 211 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018). 
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the defendant County Clerks of Kingfisher County and Garvin 
County. 
TexasFile is in the business of providing (via internet) remote 
access images of county land records to its subscribers.  TexasFile, at 
the time of these proceedings, did business in Texas, New Mexico, 
and a few counties in Oklahoma.  It had contracts with county officials 
in Blaine, Logan, Oklahoma, and Grady Counties, Oklahoma, under 
which it received digital land records for its business, and subscribers 
were allowed to access the images of the public land records. 
On May 6, 2016, TexasFile submitted a request to the County 
Clerk of Kingfisher County, pursuant to the Oklahoma Open Records 
Act, for a “complete electronic copy of all the Kingfisher County land 
records that are currently available in electronic format.”  The court 
noted that TexasFile did not request the associated tract index.  The 
communication specifically requested all records that were currently 
available on OKcountyrecords.com.  The County Clerk did not 
respond to that request.  TexasFile made a second request for an 
electronic copy of the land records on January 11, 2017. 
On May 15, 2017, the County Clerk of Kingfisher County 
responded and denied Texas File’s request, as described in more detail 
in paragraph five of the court’s opinion.   
TexasFile commenced the present declaratory judgment and 
mandamus action against the County Clerk of Kingfisher County 
“asking the trial court to enter an order determining TexasLink was 
entitled to an electronic copy of the Kingfisher County public land 
records maintained by the County Clerk, pursuant to the Oklahoma 
Open Records Act, and compelling the County Clerk of Kingfisher 
County to make available the land records of the Kingfisher County 
Clerk’s office in an electronic format at a reasonable fee.”57 
The Kingfisher County and Garvin County Clerks joined in a 
Motion to Consolidate the present case with the separate lawsuit 
TexasFile had instituted on the same issues with regard to Garvin 
County.  The district court treated that motion as a Motion to Intervene 
and granted intervention to the Garvin County Clerk.58 
TexasFile filed a prompt Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Brief in Support that set out in detail the facts and law that TexasFile 
 
 57. Id. at 212–13. 
 58. Id. at  213. 
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urged in support of its contention that the requests it had made of the 
County Clerk were valid and should be honored.  It contended that the 
case cited by the Kingfisher County Clerk, County Records, Inc. v. 
Armstrong, was inapplicable to this appeal.  TexasFile asserted that 
the Armstrong case was distinguishable because it involved a request 
for the tract index, which was and is prohibited by statute.  In contrast, 
TexasFile did not request a copy of the tract index.  Additionally, the 
Armstrong court relied on the Abstractors Act, which is not involved 
in the present action.59 
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals stated that “[t]he issue 
presented on appeal is whether a county clerk is required to provide 
an entity with an electronic copy of the county land records maintained 
by the county clerk when the copies will be used for commercial 
purposes.”60 
After proceeding through a detailed review of the issues and 
pertinent authorities, including the Armstrong case and the Open 
Records Act (which we will not attempt to fully outline in this case 
summary), the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in 
denying TexasFile’s request for the county land records of the two 
County Clerks in this case.  It affirmed the granting of summary 
judgment in favor of the County Clerks of Kingfisher and Garvin 
Counties.  The Court of Appeals also rejected TexasFile’s assertion 
that the district court erred in allowing the County Clerk of Garvin 
County to intervene in this case.  It found that the intervention at issue 
here met the requirements of Oklahoma’s intervention statute and 
served the interest of judicial economy. 
 
IV. SURFACE USE, SURFACE DAMAGES, OKLAHOMA SURFACE 
DAMAGES ACT, CONDEMNATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CASES 
 
A. Interpretation of the Oklahoma Surface Damages Act as Applying 
to One Who Owns a Current Possessory Interest in the Surface 
 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 214. 
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The case of Hobson v. Cimarex Energy Co.61 presented the 
question of “whether a vested remainderman is a surface owner under 
the [Oklahoma] Surface Damages Act.”62 
The OSC held that a vested remainderman is not a “surface 
owner” under the Act.  Rather, for purposes of the Surface Damages 
Act (“SDA”), the term “surface owner” refers to one who holds a 
current possessory interest.63 
The father in this case held a present “life estate” in the surface 
rights of the subject property in Canadian County, Oklahoma.  The son 
held a “vested remainder interest” in the surface rights.  Before drilling 
the subject well, the oil and gas lessee (“Cimarex”) reached an 
agreement with the life tenant regarding surface damages under the 
SDA.  After the well was drilled, Cimarex paid the life tenant in 
accordance with the agreement.  The son (remainderman) sued 
Cimarex claiming that Cimarex should have negotiated with him as 
well under the SDA, and he was entitled to compensation under the 
Act.  In response, Cimarex contended that a future interest owner does 
not qualify as a surface owner under the SDA.  Cimarex asserted, in 
the alternative, that a “future interest owner does qualify as a surface 
owner and his cause of action is against the life tenant.”64 
The trial court held that a vested remainderman does not 
qualify as a surface owner under the SDA and dismissed the action 
with prejudice.  On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals 
disagreed and found that the SDA focuses on ownership rather than 
possession.  It reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.  
The Oklahoma Supreme Court granted Cimarex’s petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court observed at the outset of its 
opinion that the present appeal “concerns the interpretation of ‘surface 
owner’ under the SDA.”65  It noted that “[t]he SDA defines ‘surface 
owner’ as ‘the owner or owners of record of the surface of the property 
on which the drilling operation is to occur.’”66  The court went on to 
 
 61. No. 116,721, 2019 WL 4438043 (Okla. Sept. 17, 2019). 
 62. Id. at *1. See Surface Damages Act (codified as amended at OKLA. STAT. 52 
§ 318.2 (2010)). 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. 52 § 318.2(2) (2010)). 
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make certain additional key findings and rulings in reaching its 
decision: 
1.The SDA’s definition of surface owner was found by the 
court to be ambiguous.67 
2.The court observed that a vested remainder interest (which 
the son owned in this case) becomes possessory only when the 
preceding estate (here, the father’s life estate) comes naturally to its 
end.  “The lessee of a mineral lease is statutorily required to negotiate 
with the person or persons holding a current possessory interest in the 
surface of the land.”68  The court noted that, in this case, the son would 
not hold a possessory interest until his father’s life estate came to a 
natural end. 
3.The court observed that “[i]interpreting surface owner as 
requiring current possessory interest gives effect to legislative intent 
and promotes justice.”69  [Emphasis added] To require a possessory 
interest “does not modify the rights of the life tenants and vested 
remaindermen.  A life estate entering a new minerals lease must still 
seek the remainderman’s consent because removal of minerals will 
certainly affect the corpus of the property. [Citation omitted] 
Additionally, if the life tenant’s transactions with the mineral 
leaseholder constitute an unreasonable injury to the remainderman’s 
estate, the remainderman may bring a waste claim. [Citation omitted] 
A remainderman maintains recourse for the definite removal of corpus 
and potential waste from all other actions by the life tenant.”70 
4.The court concluded by recognizing, again, that the SDA’s 
definition of “surface owner” was ambiguous.71  “This Court is 
persuaded by the common meaning, expressed legislative intent, and 
interests of justice that the SDA’s use of surface owner applies only 
to those holding a current possessory interest.  Under the SDA, a 
mineral lessee must negotiate surface damages with those who hold a 
current possessory interest in the property.  A vested remainderman 
does not hold a current possessory interest until the life estate has 
come to its nature end.”   
 
 67. Id.at *3. 
 68. Id. at *2. 
 69. Id. at *3. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
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5.The Oklahoma Supreme Court vacated the decision of the 
Court of Appeals and affirmed the order of the trial court.   
Note:  Four (4) Justices concurred in the opinion, and a Fifth 
justice concurred specially.  Four (4) justices dissented and three of 
those joined in the dissenting opinion written by Justice Darby. 
 
B. Tenth Circuit Affirms the Lower Court’s Dismissal of the 
Proposed Class Action Lawsuit by Homeowners for Alleged 
Increases in the Cost of Insurance Due to Earthquake Issues 
 
In Meier v. Chesapeake Operating L.L.C.,72 the plaintiff 
“homeowners brought a class-action lawsuit against operators of 
wastewater disposal wells for hydraulic fracturing operations, alleging 
the injection wells were significantly increasing seismic activity 
across larger portions of Oklahoma.  The only damages the 
homeowners sought were the increased costs of obtaining and 
maintaining earthquake insurance.”73  More specifically, the 
homeowners sought to recover “ ‘[t]he value of premiums paid to 
obtain earthquake insurance coverage; and/or . . . [t]he excess amount 
required to maintain earthquake insurance coverage after 2009,’ as 
well as punitive damages.”74  The lawsuit was filed in the District 
Court of Payne County, Oklahoma.  However, the defendants removed 
the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Oklahoma under the Class Action Fairness Act.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). 
The named defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit based on 
the homeowners’ alleged lack of standing and failure to state a claim.  
The federal district court held that (a) the homeowners did have 
standing to sue, (b) but it dismissed their suit for failure to state a 
claim.  The court predicted that “the Oklahoma Supreme Court, if 
confronted with the issue, would find the relief requested by plaintiffs 
not legally cognizable under the circumstances present in the case at 
bar.”75  After its review of case law from Oklahoma and other states, 
the court found no authority to support an award of insurance 
premiums under the circumstances presented.  The plaintiff 
homeowners appealed. 
 
 72. 778 F. App’x 561, 563 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 564. 
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The Tenth Circuit initially addressed the homeowners’ motion 
to certify stated questions in this appeal to the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court.  Citing prior Tenth Circuit authority regarding certification of 
questions to the highest state court, 76 the court observed as follows: 
 
While we apply judgment and restraint before 
certifying . . . we will nonetheless employ the device 
[certification of questions to the state courts] in 
circumstances where the question before us (1) may be 
determinative of the case at hand and (2) is sufficiently 
novel that we fell uncomfortable attempting to decide 
it without further guidance.77 
 
The Tenth Circuit declined the request that it certify the 
question to the OSC.  First, the court found that it was highly unlikely, 
given the state of the legal authority, that the OSC would find in favor 
of the homeowners.  It cited prior commentary to the effect that 
questions ought not to be certified if the answer is reasonably clear.  
Additionally, the court found it to be significant that the homeowners 
never requested certification of the question until the district court 
ruled against them on the merits.  It found that the fact that a party 
only raises certification of the question after an adverse district court 
ruling “weighs heavily against certification.”78  Citing those two 
primary reasons, the Tenth Circuit declined to certify the question and, 
instead, proceeded to consider the merits of the question of “whether, 
under Oklahoma law, a homeowner can sue for increased insurance 
premiums absent any actual damage to property.”79 
The appellate court found that, while no Oklahoma authority 
specifically addressed the question at issue, “other states have 
consistently failed to recognize a cause of action for increased 
insurance premiums based on a tortfeasor’s negligence.”80  The Tenth 
Circuit concluded that it was “highly unlikely the Oklahoma Supreme 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (quoting Pino v. United States, 507 F.3d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
 78. Id. at 565.   
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 566. 
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Court would allow proportional recovery for unmaterialized risk here, 
given its refusal to extend the loss-of-a-chance doctrine elsewhere.”81 
The Tenth Circuit engaged in further analysis of additional 
case law and concluded that, “[b]ecause the homeowners pleaded no 
legally cognizable claim for relief, the district court properly 
dismissed their complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).”  The court declined 
to certify the question to the OSC and affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of the lawsuit.  
 
C. Tenth Circuit Affirms District Court’s Exclusion of Two Expert 
Witnesses for the Plaintiff and Summary Judgment Ruling in Favor 
of Defendants 
 
The plaintiff in Hall v. Conoco Inc.82 lived near the defendants’ 
(ConocoPhillips) Oklahoma refinery as a child.  “Roughly two 
decades later, Ms. Hall developed a form of leukemia,” which was 
alleged to have resulted from her early exposure to the refinery’s 
emissions of benzene.83  Hall sued ConocoPhillips for negligence, 
negligence per se, and strict liability.84  In her effort to prove the 
alleged link between the refinery’s emissions and her development of 
leukemia, Hall proposed to present three expert witnesses at trial.  The 
district court granted ConocoPhillips’ motion to exclude the expert 
testimony of two of the proposed experts (i.e., Dr. Gore and Dr. 
Calvey).  The court also granted summary judgment to ConocoPhillips 
finding that, in the absence of the testimony of the excluded witnesses, 
Hall had not presented sufficient evidence linking her disease to 
benzene exposure.85  Hall appealed. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals began its review of the 
issues by reviewing the primary standards applicable to the exclusion 
of expert testimony.  The court further observed that expert testimony 
must be determined to be reliable before the district court can admit 
the testimony.  “The district court’s assessment of reliability is review 
for an abuse of discretion,”86 which includes an assessment of whether 
 
 81. Id. at 567. 
 82. 886 F.3d 1308, 1310 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 1311. 
 86. Id. 
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the reasoning and methodology is both scientifically valid and 
applicable to a particular set of facts. 
The appellate court reviewed and summarized the pertinent 
facts below in detail and concluded that Dr. Gore’s proposed 
testimony could be justifiably regarded by the district court as 
unreliable “because of his failure to (1) justify ruling in benzene, or 
(2) rule out idiopathic87 causes.”88  The Tenth Circuit found that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Gore’s 
opinion.  With respect to Dr. Calvey, the court noted that her testimony 
“was excluded in part because Dr. Calvey had not ‘adequately 
address[ed] the issue of exposure.’”89  Hall did not challenge that 
rationale, which the Tenth Circuit found “[foreclosed] reversal of the 
exclusion of Dr. Calvey’s testimony.”90 
Turning to the summary judgment ruling in favor of the 
defendants, Hall argued that circumstantial evidence (e.g., “the 
presence of hydrocarbon leaks and odors in her neighborhood, 
groundwater contamination, a high benzene reading near her residence 
. . .”91) was sufficient to defeat summary judgment.  However, the 
Tenth Circuit found that the circumstantial evidence did not “create a 
genuine issue of material fact on causation because of the need for 
expert testimony on the link between her disease and benzene 
exposure and quantification of Mr. Hall’s exposure to benzene.”92  
Without the testimony of Dr. Gore and Dr. Calvey, Hall could not meet 
her burden on the foregoing causation issues.  The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of 
ConocoPhillips. 
 
V. TRIBAL AND INDIAN LAND MATTERS 
 
A. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Affirms District Court’s Finding 
of Trespass by Pipeline Owner Who Continued to Operate Pipeline 
After Expiration of its Limited Term Easement, but Reversed the 
 
 87. Dr. Gore and other experts described an “idiopathic” disease as a disease in 
which the cause is unknown. Id. at footnote 1. 
 88. Id. at 1316.  
 89. Id., citing Hall v. Conoco Phillips, 248 F.Supp.3d 1177, 1193 (W.D. Okla. 
2017). 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.at 1317. 
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Permanent Injunction Below Based Upon the Standard Applied in 
Granting the Injunction 
 
The dispute presented in Davilla v. Enable Midstream 
Partners L.P.93 arose in connection with the expiration of a twenty-
year pipeline easement that covered certain Native American Indian 
allotted lands in Oklahoma.  Enable Intrastate Transmission, LLC 
owned and operated a natural gas pipeline that traversed the lands.  
After the easement expired, Enable did not remove the pipeline, but 
rather continued to operate it.  Enable ultimately approached certain 
allottees and sought a new twenty-year easement.  It also applied to 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) for approval of a new easement.  
However, Enable failed to obtain approval for the proposed new 
easement from the allottees of a majority of the equitable interests in 
the land as required by applicable regulations.   
As a result, the BIA cancelled Enable’s right-of-way 
application.  As Enable continued to operate the pipeline, a large group 
of individuals who held certain rights in the subject lands (the 
Allottees) filed suit in federal court alleging that Enable was 
trespassing on their land.  They asked the court to enter an injunction 
compelling Enable to remove its pipeline.  The parties were able to 
stipulate to most of the relevant facts.  The Allottees moved for 
summary judgment on the issues of liability for trespass and injunctive 
relief.  The court granted the Allottees’ motion and requests for relief.  
Enable appealed.   
Enable asserted two primary arguments on appeal.  First, it 
argued that “the district court erred in granting summary judgment in 
favor of the Allottees on their trespass claims.”94  Second, Enable 
asserted that “the district court erred in issuing a permanent injunction 
to enforce the summary judgment ruling.”95 
In addressing the issues raised on appeal, the Tenth Circuit 
noted at the outset that “it is the law, not the material facts, that 
complicates this case.”96  The court further recognized that “[b]ecause 
we lack a federal body of trespass law to protect the Allottees’ federal 
property interests, we must borrow state law to the extent it comports 
 
 93. 913 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 2019). 
 94. Id. at 964. 
 95. Id. at 964–65. 
 96. Id. (Emphasis added by the court). 
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with federal policy.”97  The court went on to observe that “[t]he State 
of Oklahoma recognizes a right of action in trespass where one person 
‘actual[ly] physical[ly] inva[des] . . . the real estate of another without 
the permission of the person lawfully entitled to possession.’”98  The 
Tenth Circuit concluded as follows: 
 
Our reading of Oklahoma law thus yields three 
elements constituting the Allottees’ federal trespass 
claims.  First, the Allottees must prove an entitlement 
to possession of the allotment.  Second, they must 
prove Enable physically entered or remained on the 
allotment.  Finally, they must prove Enable lacked a 
legal right—express or implied—to enter or remain. 
The stipulated facts already described definitively 
prove the first two elements.99  
 
However, Enable took issue with the entry of summary 
judgment on the third element of the trespass claim.  Enable contended 
that it had produced evidence of consent sufficient to prove a legal 
right to maintain the pipeline on the subject lands despite the 
expiration of the easement.  More specifically, Enable showed that, in 
2004, it had “obtained written consent forms from five of the thirty-
seven individual Allottees in this case,”100 showing that the five were 
willing to grant a new right-of-way for the pipeline in exchange for 
cash consideration.   
While the Tenth Circuit noted that “evidence of a plaintiff’s 
consent to a defendant’s entry on the land will defeat liability in cases 
where the plaintiff’s consent itself creates a right to enter or 
remain,”101 it found that such evidence would not be sufficient in the 
present context. 
 
When it comes to maintaining a pipeline over Indian 
allotted land, however, Congress has dictated the 
prerequisites of a right to enter by statute.  Enable thus 
 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 966. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 967. 
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has no legal right to keep a structure on the Allottees’ 
land unless and until it secures a right-of-way for that 
purpose from the Secretary of the Interior.  See 25 
U.S.C. § 323.  The Secretary must, in turn, have the 
approval of the relevant Indian stakeholders.102 
 
The court found that the authorities cited by Enable fell short 
of holding “that one cotenant has no right of action for trespass under 
Oklahoma law when another cotenant—much less a small minority of 
co-tenancy interests—has agreed to a right-of-way easement.”103  
Moreover, the court observed that, even if Oklahoma law were to 
provide that such evidence could defeat a trespass claim, “federal 
courts should only incorporate state rules of decision into federal 
claims to the extent those rules are consistent with federal law and 
policy.”104  The court concluded that Enable’s view of the law would 
“frustrate federal Indian land policy, effectively robbing Indian 
allottees and the government of meaningful control over 
alienation.”105  Enable lacked a legal right to keep the pipeline in the 
ground. 
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the second key argument of 
Enable with regard to the trespass claim—i.e., that, even if the 
easement had expired, no duty to remove the pipeline ever arose 
because the Allottees never demanded that Enable remove it.  
Recognizing, again, that Oklahoma law would be incorporated into the 
subject federal claim so long as it did not frustrate federal policy, the 
court found that Oklahoma case law does not create a requirement that 
prior demand be made.106  Rather, citing provisions of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, “the easement’s expiration created a duty to remove 
the pipeline. . . Indeed, there would have been no sense in limiting the 
easement term to twenty years otherwise.”107 
The court concluded that “Enable acquired the pipeline 
already knowing the right-of-way would eventually expire.  It 
 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.   
 105. Id. at 967–68. 
 106. Id. at 969. 
 107. Id. The court did, however, discuss the easement holder’s potential right to 
re-enter the property after the expiration of the easement for the purpose of removing 
the pipeline. Id. at 969–70. 
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therefore cannot—and indeed does not—claim it lacked notice of its 
duty to remove or intent to maintain the trespass.”108 
Finally, the Tenth Circuit reviewed Enable’s challenge to the 
permanent injunction issued by the district court requiring Enable to 
remove the pipeline.  As to this third basis for the appeal, the court 
agreed with Enable.  The court recognized that a district court abuses 
its discretion when it bases its decision on an erroneous conclusion of 
law.  Here, “the district court relied primarily on Oklahoma law—with 
supplemental authority from other federal courts—to conclude that 
‘equity will restrain [a continuing] trespass.’ [citations omitted] As a 
result, it did not apply the usual four-factor test guiding federal courts’ 
grant of permanent injunctive relief.”109  
The court found that, in determining whether to apply 
Oklahoma law or federal law in determining the standards for a 
permanent injunction, the court should consider:  
 
(1) “whether application of state law would frustrate 
specific” federal interests, (2) whether there is a “need 
for a nationally uniform body of law,” and (3) other 
considerations such as whether “application of a 
federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships 
predicated on state law.”110 
 
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred because the 
circumstances in the present lawsuit indicated a distinct need for 
nationwide legal standards.  “This uniform standard is necessary 
because the Secretary has undoubtedly approved easements over and 
across Indian land in multiple states.”111  The court noted that similar 
circumstances as those in the present dispute could lead other 
easement holders to be subject to an order of removal upon expiration 
of their easements.  If the court did not apply a uniform standard in 
determining those issues, “an easement holder in Oklahoma and one 
in Kansas could be subject to differing permanent injunction standards 
 
 108. Id. at 970. 
 109. Id. at 971. 
 110. Id. at 972. 
 111. Id.  
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despite both receiving an easement from the Secretary of the Interior 
pursuant to the same federal program.”112   
 
By failing to apply the federal courts’ traditional equity 
jurisprudence to its remedy analysis, the [district court] 
committed an error of law and thus abused its equitable 
discretion.  Accordingly, we must reverse the 
injunction order and remand for a full weighing of the 
equities.113 
 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Allottees.  It 
reversed the entry of the permanent injunction, and remanded the case 
for further proceedings. 
 
B. United States Supreme Court Defers Decision to Allow for 
Additional Briefing and Oral Arguments in Pending Challenge to 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision on Whether Congress Ever 
“Disestablished” the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation 
 
In a decision issued August 8, 2017, in the appeal of the 
defendant’s conviction for an alleged brutal crime, the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reached findings and conclusions that are of 
substantial concern to both the Oklahoma energy industry and the 
business community generally.114  Murphy, a member of the 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation asserted in this appeal that he was wrongly 
prosecuted and convicted in the Oklahoma state courts for a crime that 
occurred in Indian Country (as defined in 18 U.S.C. §1151) over 
which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.  The state district 
court rejected Murphy’s argument, finding that the crime had occurred 
on state land.  
In a 126-page opinion addressing the issues on appeal, the 
Tenth Circuit found that, under the principles of Solem v. Bartlett,115 
Congress never disestablished the Creek Reservation.  The case was 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 971. 
 114. Murphy v. Royal, 866 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 115. 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984). 
  
326 TEXAS A&M J. OF PROP. L. [Vol. 6 
 
remanded to the state district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus 
vacating Murphy’s conviction and sentence.   
Royal filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court on February 6, 2018.  The Petition was granted by the 
Court on May 21, 2018.  Multiple amicus curiae briefs were filed.  The 
parties and certain of the amicus participants presented oral argument 
to the Supreme Court on November 27, 2018. 
On December 4, 2018, the Supreme Court directed the parties, 
the Solicitor General, and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation to file 
supplemental briefs addressing two questions:  
 
(1) Whether any statute grants the state of Oklahoma 
jurisdiction over the prosecution of crimes committed 
by Indians in the area within the 1866 territorial 
boundaries of the Creek Nation, irrespective of the 
area’s reservation status. (2) Whether there are 
circumstances in which land qualifies as an Indian 
reservation but nonetheless does not meet the 
definition of Indian country as set forth in 18 U. S. C. 
§1151(a).116 
 
The supplemental briefs were filed in late December 2018 and 
in January 2019.  On June 27, 2019, the appeal in Murphy was restored 
to the calendar for re-argument but without specifying a particular 
date.  As of the date this report was prepared, no specific date appeared 
to have been set for the presentation of the anticipated further oral 
arguments before the Court. 
As a final note for those who are only lightly watching for 
further developments in this case, the case appears to be destined to 
experience at least three name changes during the several years it has 
pended on appeal.  At the time the Tenth Circuit proceedings were 
filed and through the date the Tenth Circuit issued its decision, the 
case was entitled Murphy v. Royal.117  Mr. Terry Royal was, at that 
time, the Warden of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary.  When initial 
oral arguments were presented to the United States Supreme Court in 
 
 116. Order for Supplemental Briefing, Carpenter v. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 626 
(2018) (No. 17-1107) https://www.supremecourt.gov/qp/17-01107qp.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2ZCZ-3W9X]. 
 117. Murphy, 866 F.3d 1164. 
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the Fall of 2018, the case was entitled Carpenter v. Murphy,118 because 
Mr. Mike Carpenter had assumed the role of Interim Warden of the 
Oklahoma State Penitentiary.  By letter dated July 25, 2019, counsel 
for the Petitioner notified the Clerk for the United States Supreme 
Court that Mr. Tommy Sharp now serves as the Interim Warden of the 
Oklahoma State Penitentiary and will be automatically substituted as 
the Petitioner in this appeal in future proceedings.  
 
VI. OTHER ENERGY INDUSTRY CASES 
 
A. Carried Working Interest Owner Sues to Recover its Claimed 
Share of Production Proceeds Under the Production Revenue 
Standards Act 
 
The court in Abraham v. Palm Operating, LLC,119 was 
presented with a suit by Abraham alleging violations of Oklahoma’s 
Production Revenue Standards Act, conversion, and restitution.  
Specifically, Abraham (a carried working interest owner in an oil and 
gas lease covering the Elias Kerns No. 2 well) sued the well operator 
(Palm) and the first purchaser (Pacer) for his alleged share of the 
proceeds from the sale of production.  Abraham also sued the 
defendants for interest on the unpaid proceeds based on the alleged 
violation of the Production Revenue Standards Act (“PRSA”),120 
actual and punitive damages for conversion, and for restitution.  The 
first purchaser, Pacer, denied liability and asserted, as affirmative 
defenses, the expiration of applicable statutes of limitation, laches, and 
waiver.  Pacer further alleged that Abraham lacked clear marketable 
title, and that any failure by Pacer to make payment was due to 
Abraham’s negligence or lack of diligence, as well as error by the 
operator Palm or prior operators.  
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Abraham for $22,859.52 in production proceeds plus 12% interest, 
costs, and attorney fees.  The purchaser, Pacer, appealed. 
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals noted at the outset of its 
decision, in footnote 2, that the parties disputed whether Abraham’s 
 
 118. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Carpenter v. Murphy, 139 S. Ct. 626 (2018) (No. 
17-1107). 
 119. 447 P.3d 486, 487 (Okla. Civ. App. 2019). 
 120. Id. 
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ownership121 interest was properly characterized as a “carried working 
interest” (notwithstanding the fact that the assignment in Abraham’s 
favor stated that it was assigning a carried working interest).  
However, the court stated that the “type of ownership interest 
Abraham has is not material to this dispute.”122  
As for the primary issue presented in the appeal, the court 
found that one of the most important facts on appeal was that the 
parties agreed that at Palm’s (the operator’s) direction, the purchaser 
(Pacer) paid to Palm the working interest proceeds for the production 
the purchaser took from the well.  Pacer asserted that it had no liability 
for the production proceeds after it paid them to the producing 
owner/operator Palm, pursuant to 52 O.S. 2011, §570.10(C)(1).  The 
court further noted that the evidentiary materials before the court 
showed that Palm was the producing owner under the PRSA. 
Abraham additionally argued that Section 570.10(C)(1) did 
not apply to this case “because, according to Abraham, while Palm 
may have been the producing owner of some of the production, it was 
not the producing owner of the portion of the production attributable 
to Abraham’s interest.”123  Rather, Abraham was the owner of that 
production.  After discussing the operation of the PRSA provisions in 
further detail, the Court of Appeals concluded: 
 
The evidentiary materials in the record show that 
Abraham was not the operator or producing owner and 
that Palm was the operator and producing owner.  
Abraham has not disputed Pacer’s assertion that it paid 
the proceeds of production to Palm and therefore, 
under §570.10(C)(1), Pacer has discharged its liability 
for payment of proceeds of production.  Pacer was 
therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all 
of Abraham’s claims against Pacer.124 
 
Finally, in apparent indication as to the reason why Abraham 
pursued recovery against the purchaser of production with greater 
effort than the operator, the court advises in footnote 3 of its opinion 
 
 121. Id. at 488 n.2. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 489. 
 124. Id.  
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that, before this case was filed, Palm’s assets had been placed in 
receivership in an action filed by a bank in another county, and Palm’s 
predecessor in title had sought bankruptcy protection.  Abraham 
asserted that he dismissed his claims against Palm.  In contrast, Pacer 
contended that Abraham’s claims against Palm were simply stayed.125 
 
 
 125. Id. at 488 n.3. 
